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THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
REPUBLICAN CHINA AND CONTEMPORARY 
TAIWAN 
PASHA L. HSIEH 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the evolution of international law as a 
professional and intellectual discipline in the Republic of China (ROC), 
which has governed Mainland China (1912–1949) and post-1949 Taiwan. 
The ROC’s centennial development fundamentally shaped modern China’s 
course of foreign relations and postwar global governance. The Article 
argues that statism, pragmatism, and idealism define the major features of 
the ROC’s approach to international law. These characteristics 
transformed the law of nations into universally valid normative claims and 
prompted modern China’s intellectual focus on the civilized nation 
concept. First, the Article analyzes the professionalization of the discipline 
of international law. It offers insight into the cultivation of China’s first-
generation international lawyers in the Foreign Ministry, international 
law societies, and the Shanghai Mixed Court. Second, it explores the 
ROC’s approach of assertive legalism in applying international law to 
advance diplomatic objectives. The nation’s strategic engagement with 
unequal treaties, the League of Nations, and the United Nations 
contributed to its Grotian moment. The assertion of legal claims in 
judicial proceedings and Taiwan’s international standing further 
reinforced the dynamic dimension of the discipline. Therefore, this Article 
provides a valuable case study of twentieth century international 
lawmaking in East Asia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After ending more than two thousand years of imperial rule in China, 
the Republic of China (ROC) became Asia’s first republic in 1912. 
Through two World Wars, the ROC ushered the fragile country into the 
global order and realized the revolutionists’ aspiration of elevating China’s 
status to a “civilized nation” under international law.1 The ROC was the 
sole legitimate government of Mainland China before the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Following the loss of the civil 
war to its Communist rival, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT or 
Kuomintang) government of the ROC relocated to Taiwan and has 
continued to govern the island ever since. The ROC’s centennial 
development, which shaped the course of modern China’s foreign 
 
 
 1. See Proclamation of President Sun Yat-sen on the Establishment of the Republic of China on 
January 1, 1912 [1912 Proclamation], http://www.njmuseum.com/zh/book/cqgc_big5/zhmg.htm 
(“With the establishment of Provisional Government we will try our best to carry out the duties of a 
civilized nation so as to obtain the rights of a civilized state.”). The preamble to the 1907 Hague 
Convention first mentioned the term, “civilized nations,” which included China as a signatory country. 
Gustavo Gozzi, History of International Law and Western Civilization, 9 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 353, 
365 (2007).  
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/7
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relations, provides a valuable case study of twentieth century international 
lawmaking in East Asia. 
This Article enriches the existing international law literature for two 
reasons. First, among emerging scholarship on the historical foundation of 
international law, the universalization of the “public law of Europe” in 
post-Empire China is critical, yet largely ignored.2 The discussion on the 
Qing Dynasty and the PRC fails to thoroughly explain modern China’s 
“Grotian moment” and its influence on the international legal order.3 Thus, 
this research fills the gap with a two-year investigation based on first-hand 
declassified diplomatic archives, as well as interviews with scholars and 
government officials in China and Taiwan. Second, this Article provides 
the first systemic analysis of the cultivation of China’s first-generation 
international lawyers and their strategic engagement in international law. 
These prominent jurists, who served as diplomats and judges of 
international courts, played a crucial role in the ROC’s revision of treaties 
and in the creation of the League of Nations (LN) and the United Nations 
(UN).4 Their intellectual legacy is further evidenced by their restoration of 
the capacity for international law in Taiwan and the post-Cultural 
Revolution PRC and by their legalist approach to tackle the recognition 
issue after the UN deprived the ROC of the “China seat” in 1971.5 
The Article argues that the “Republican Chinese characteristics” of 
statism, pragmatism, and idealism define the major features of the ROC’s 
 
 
 2. Recent literature on the historical aspects of international law, see THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bardo Fasssbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); HATSUE 
SHINOHARA, US INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS IN THE INTERWAR YEARS: A FORGOTTEN CRUSADE 
(2012); Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of 
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L.J. 475 (2010). For details on the “public law of 
Europe” as the foundation of international law, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European 
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315, 336–38 (2006). 
 3. The prominent scholarship on China and International Law often focuses on the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and ignores the Republic of China (ROC) era. E.g., Bing Bing Jia, A 
Synthesis of the Notion of Sovereignty and the Ideal of the Rule of Law: Reflections on the 
Contemporary Chinese Approach to International Law, 53 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 11 (2013) and XUE 
HANQIN, CHINESE CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORY, CULTURE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).  
 4. Chinese judges, nominated by the ROC, sitting on international courts include Wang Chung-
hui (1921–1939) and Cheng Tien-hsi (1939–1946) of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ), Hsu Mo (1946–1957) and Wellington Koo (1957–1967) of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), and Mei Ju-ao (1946–1948) of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal). 
 5. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) transferred the China seat from 
the ROC to the PRC. Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United 
Nations, G.A. Res. 2758 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2758 (Oct. 25, 1971). 
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international law approach.6 It further contends that these characteristics 
transformed the law of nations into universally valid, normative claims 
and prompted modern China’s intellectual shift to the civilized nation 
concept. These developments in international law are critical to current 
global governance. This Article is structured in four parts. Part II examines 
the ROC’s professionalization of the discipline of international law, which 
was based on the Qing Court’s legacy on the reception of the law of 
nations. It offers insight into the development of international law 
education and its impact on China’s first-generation international lawyers. 
Moreover, it analyzes how these jurists emerged in tandem with the 
evolution of the Foreign Ministry, international law societies, and the 
Shanghai Mixed Court. Part III explores the utilization of international law 
in advancing the ROC’s diplomatic objectives. The case studies, which 
demonstrate the ROC’s assertive legalism, include the rebus sic stantibus 
argument in renegotiating unequal treaties and the nation’s participation in 
the LN and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). The 
ROC’s idealist faith in international law further culminated in the creation 
of the UN and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The international 
lawyers’ intellectual legacy has also helped Taiwan advance its sui generis 
status. Part IV concludes by outlining the significance of international law 
as a professional and intellectual discipline in Republican China and 
contemporary Taiwan. 
II. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ROC 
Although Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War 
and Peace) was published in 1625, China’s early encounters with the West 
did not reflect the influence of modern international law. The conventional 
understanding of China’s first treaty was the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk 
concerning Sino-Russia border disputes.7 In fact, the 1662 peace treaty 
concluded between Koxinga (Zheng Cheng-gong) of the defunct Ming 
Dynasty and the Dutch governor constituted the prelude to international 
agreements in Chinese history.8 This treaty paved the way for the 
withdrawal of Dutch troops and contributed to the end of almost forty 
 
 
 6. The Republican Chinese characteristics are distinct from commonly known “Chinese 
characteristics,” which refer to the PRC’s neo-Confucian approach that focuses on the Westphalian 
concept of absolute sovereignty and governmental control. 
 7. Wang Tieya, International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, 
RECUEIL DES COURS, vol. 221, at 227 (1990-II). 
 8. Hungdah Chiu, The Reception of Modern International Law in China, 9 CHENGCHI L. REV. 
189, 192 (1973). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/7
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years of Dutch rule over Taiwan.9 Because these treaties were largely 
reciprocal, they did not stimulate intellectual interest in international law 
in China. Understanding the law of nations only became a national 
necessity when the Qing Court encountered unequal treaties, beginning 
with the 1842 Treaty of Nanking10 with the United Kingdom. Through the 
statist approach to education, the ROC expedited the professionalization of 
international law. The newly cultivated international lawyers gained 
experience from universities, the government and the Shanghai Mixed 
Court. Their positivist stance on international law galvanized the 
discipline’s development and the ROC’s legalist approach to diplomacy. 
A. The Evolution of International Law Education 
The statist approach to international law education developed during 
the Qing Dynasty. The discipline of international law was first 
systematically introduced into China when W. A. P. Martin, an American 
Presbyterian missionary, translated Henry Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law in 1864.11 The Chinese translation, known as Wanguo 
Gongfa (Public Law of All Nations), had a profound impact on the 
discipline in East Asia.12 In 1873, Martin began his teaching of “Law of 
Nations” at Tongwenguan (Interpreters College).13 He became China’s 
first professor of international law. Tongwenguan was also the first 
national institution that offered an international law course. Nonetheless, 
the fact that only nine of 102 students enrolled in the elective course 
suggests that international law was viewed as a fringe discipline.14 The 
Imperial University of Peking (Jing Shi Da Xue Tang), the predecessor to 
today’s Peking University, subsequently replaced Tongwenguan. Martin 
was appointed as the president of the new university. In the Department of 
 
 
 9. Taiwan was under Dutch rule from 1624 to 1662. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 2012, 
at 45. The peace treaty consists of Dutch and Chinese versions, which include 18 and 16 provisions 
respectively. 
 10. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (2000), at 189–90. 
 11. LYDIA H. LIU, THE CLASH OF EMPIRES: THE INVENTION OF CHINA IN MODERN WORLD 
MAKING 113–15 (2004). 
 12. Id.; Han Sang-hee, The Circulation of International Legal Terms in East Asia, ASLI 
Working Paper, No. 014, July 2010, 3–25. 
 13. LIN XUEZHONG, CONG WAN GUO GONG FA DAO GONG FA WAI JIAO: WAN QING GUO JI FA 
DE CHUAN RU, QUAN SHI YU YING YONG [From Law of Nations to Public Law Diplomacy: The 
Introduction, Interpretation and Application of International Law in Late Qing] 126–27, 153 (2009). 
W. A. P. Martin’s course was based on a more updated textbook of Theodore D. Woolsey’s 
Introduction to the Study of International Law, known as Gong Fa Bian Lan. Shin Kawashima, China, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 463. 
 14. LIN XUEZHONG, supra note 13, at 130. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Law, public international law and private international law were 
collectively taught as “Law of Negotiation” (Jiao She Fa).15  
I offer the following observations for the Qing Court’s reception of 
international law. First, the Western notion of sovereignty came as an 
intellectual shock. Wanguo Gongfa explained that “[s]overeignty is the 
supreme power by which any State is governed” and that a state should 
function “independently of foreign powers.”16 The book enabled Chinese 
officials to understand that the privilege of extraterritoriality and the right 
of foreign warships to navigate in internal waters actually encroached 
upon Chinese sovereignty. Second, the university course entitled “Law of 
Negotiation” illustrated that international law was commonly regarded as a 
tool of negotiation rather than as a universal value. For instance, before the 
First Opium War, Lin Zexu’s ban on the opium trade was based on 
passages from Emerich Vattel’s 1758 Law of Nations on embargos and 
blockades.17His letter to Queen Victoria challenged Britain’s dual 
standards on opium and urged the British to obey Chinese law in the same 
way that foreigners follow British law in the United Kingdom.18 Instead of 
believing the normative truth of international law, Lin’s intention was 
simply to use “Western” arguments to persuade the British.19 Therefore, 
with respect to the reception of international law, it is premature to 
conclude that nineteenth-century Chinese scholars were positivists.20 
Finally, the difference between Vattel’s universalism and Wheaton’s 
parochial understanding of international law, which was limited to 
Christian civilization, did not impede Chinese reception of international 
law.21 The discipline of international law in the Chinese context rarely 
considered the diverse schools of thought on the application of 
international law. Also, as pragmatism dictated, the concept of natural law 
as the basis of international law was de-emphasized. 
 
 
 15. Id. at 153; Sun Huei-min, Cong Dong Jing, Beijing Dao Shanghai: Ri Xi Fa Xue Jiao Yu Yu 
Zhong Guo Lv Shi De Yang Cheng (1902–1914) [From Tokyo, Beijing to Shanghai: Japanese Legal 
Education and the Development of Chinese Lawyers (1902–1914)], 3 FA ZHI SHI YAN JIU [J. of Legal 
History Studies] 157, 176 (2002).  
 16. See PETER ZARROW, AFTER EMPIRE 91 (2012) (discussing Wheaton’s explanation of 
sovereignty). 
 17. LIU, supra note 11, at 119; Chi-Hua Tang, China-Europe, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 2, at 704–05. 
 18. See, e.g., Appendix: Lin Zexu’s Communication to Queen Victoria, reprinted in LIU, supra 
note 11, at 235–37. 
 19. See LIU, supra note 11, at 119 (“Lin treated international law not as the universal truth but as 
a mode of persuasion.”). 
 20. Cf. Lorca, supra note 2, 486–90, 534–35. 
 21. ODD ARNE WESTAD, RESTLESS EMPIRE: CHINA AND THE WORLD SINCE 1750 81–82 (2012). 
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015] THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 
 
 
 
 
During the first wave of the reception of international law, translations 
from Europe and the United States were critical to China’s efforts to enter 
the family of nations. Important treatises that the international law 
literature often ignore include Charles de Martens’ Le Guide 
Diplomatique.22 This book helped early Chinese diplomats, starting from 
those posted to the London-based Chinese Legation in 1877, understand 
diplomatic customs and rules.23 In addition, the translation of Robert 
Joseph Phillimore’s Commentaries upon International Law became 
China’s first book on private international law.24 In the late nineteenth 
century, the second wave of international law learning shifted to Japan, a 
traditional tributary state of the Chinese Empire. Although Japan’s 
exposure to the law of nations began with Wanguo Gongfa, the Meiji 
Restoration led to Japan outpacing China in legal reform and legal 
material translations. Japan’s complete abolition of extraterritoriality in 
1899 and its military victory over Russia in 1905 transformed the state 
into Asia’s first “civilized nation.”25 Consequently, the Qing government 
“looked east” for international law instructors. From 1905 to 1908, Iwai 
Takafumi served as an invited international law professor at the Peking 
College of Law (Jin Shi Fa Lu Xue Tang).26 These significant events, 
along with language proximity and lax immigration requirements, 
encouraged Chinese students to pursue legal studies in Japan. Chinese 
graduates from Japanese schools subsequently influenced the ROC’s 
discipline of international law. 
Until the 1920s, the majority of China’s international textbooks were 
translated from Japanese either by Japanese professors in China or by 
Chinese students in Japan.27 These translations solidified the Chinese 
 
 
 22. Charles De Martens, Le Guide diplomatique précis des droits et des fonctions des agents 
diplomatiques et consulaires, suivi d'un traité des actes et offices divers qui sont du ressort de la 
diplomatie, accompagné de pièces et documents proposés comme exemples (M.F.H. Geffcken, 
Leipzig, and Paris eds., 5th ed. 1866). The Chinese translation, entitled Xingyao Zhizhang, is based on 
this book. 
 23. See IMMANUEL C. Y. HSU, CHINA’S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS: THE 
DIPLOMATIC PHASE 1858–1880 167–84 (1960) (discussing the posting of Qing envoys to European 
nations). 
 24. The Chinese translation, entitled Geguo Jiaoshe Bianfalun, is based on 4 Robert Phillimore. 
COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR COMITY (1861). 
 25. In 1900, the US Supreme Court described Japan as “the last state admitted into the rank of 
civilized nations.” The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900). 
 26. YUAN-SHENG HUANG, FA LV JI SHOU YU JIN DAI ZHONG GUO FA [The Reception of Law 
and Modern Chinese Law] 64 (2007). 
 27. The list of Japanese translations, see RUNE SVARVERUD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS WORLD 
ORDER IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA: TRANSLATION, RECEPTION AND DISCOURSE, 1847–1911 269–302 
(2007). 
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understanding of statehood and sovereignty under international law.28 
Another conspicuous influence was Japan’s international law terminology. 
The most notable example is the term “international law,” which Jeremy 
Bentham first coined in 1789.29 Mitsukuri Rinsho’s translation of Guo Ji 
Fa (international law) mostly replaced the Chinese indigenous translation, 
Wanguo Gongfa or Gongfa (public law), in the 1920s.30 Also, as many 
Japanese-trained students joined the revolutionist camp and served as 
ROC bureaucrats, their international law understanding influenced the 
early Republic’s foreign policy. Honoring the principle of pacta sunct 
servanda (treaties must be observed) by confirming the validity of Qing 
treaties that they deemed unfair indicated their commitment to 
international law. Given the failure of the Taiping Rebellion and the short-
lived Republic of Taiwan, the ROC’s founding fathers understood that 
only the “civilized” approach could gain the West’s diplomatic 
recognition. In addition to the new government’s legitimacy, the pragmatic 
need behind the search for recognition was to attain the legal capacity to 
get foreign loans to finance ammunition and infrastructure. Although 
Wheaton introduced the civilized nation concept to China, the concept 
only received attention when Qing officials participated in the two Hague 
Peace Conferences.31 Foreign-trained ROC elites drove the civilized nation 
standard to be the nation’s highest guiding principle. In Sun Yat-sen’s own 
words, upholding this principle would help China “obtain the rights of a 
civilized state.”32 
Based on such a belief, the ROC strengthened the nature of statism in 
international law education and laid the foundation for the third wave of 
the reception of international law. The influence of the United States and 
the surfacing of China’s international lawyers were the features of this era. 
International law became a mandatory subject in both judicial and 
diplomat examinations in the 1910s.33 The government also made 
 
 
 28. ZARROW, supra note 16, at 98–100. 
 29. Jeremy Bentham created the English term “international law” in his book, Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, and “international law” replaced the older term “law of nations.” 
MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 1776–1939, 12–13 (2010). 
 30. Hungdah Chiu, The Development of Chinese International Law Terms and the Problem of 
Their Translation into English, 27 J. ASIAN STUDIES 485, 490 (1968). 
 31. LIU, supra note 11, at 135; LIN, supra note 13, at 306–40 (2009). 
 32. 1912 Proclamation, supra note 1. 
 33. Li Qicheng, Xuan Tong Er Nian De Fa Guan Kao Shi [The 1910 Judicial Examination], 3 FA 
ZHI SHI YAN JIU [J. Legal History Studies] 197, 198–207 (2002); Li Zhaoxiang, Zhong Hua Ming Guo 
Zao Qi Wai Jiao De Xin Bian Hua: Yi Wai Jiao Li Fa Wei Zhong Xin [New Changes to Early 
Diplomacy of the ROC: Focusing on Diplomatic Legislation], in BEI YANG SHI QI DE ZHONG GUO 
WAI JIAO [Chinese Diplomacy in the Beiyang Era] 91, 107–08 (2006).  
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss1/7
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international law compulsory in the college curriculum. Beiyang 
University had the longest teaching hours of international and comparative 
law courses, including public international law (10 credit hours) and 
English law (12 credit hours).34 Located in Shanghai, Soochow University 
Law School offered the first English-taught international law course.35 
Moreover, many graduates from Tsinghua School, which was founded 
with the US Boxer Indemnity, pursued college and legal education in 
America.36 Starting in the 1920s, overseas-trained lawyers started 
returning to enhance China’s academia in international law. Prominent 
examples were Zhou Gengsheng of Peking University and Wang 
Huacheng of Tsinghua University, who studied at Paris and Chicago 
universities, respectively.37 Zhou’s 1929 Outline of International Law 
(Guo Ji Fa Da Gang)38 became the first international law textbook 
authored by a Chinese national.39 During the Sino-Japanese war, 
international law professors fled to the temporary capital of Chongqing 
and continued teaching at the Central Political School and the National 
Southwestern Associated University.40 Toward the end of the civil war, 
 
 
 34. Beiyang University is the predecessor to Tianjing University. ZHONGGUO JINDAIJIAOYUSHI 
ZILIAOHUIBIAN [Compilation of Reference Materials related to China’s History in Modern Education] 
419 (2007). International law courses offered by Peking University’s Department of Law were divided 
into “International Law in Peace Time” (Ping Shi Guo Ji Gong Fa) and “International Law of War” 
(Zhan Shi Guo Ji Gong Fa). Id. at 395. Shanxi University provided a one-year course on treaty law. Id. 
at 428.  
 35. As the 1930–1931 curricula demonstrate, a four-credit-hour international law course was 
offered in both English and Chinese at Soochow, also known as the Comparative Law School of 
China. Alison W. Conner, Training China’s Early Modern Lawyers: Soochow University Law School, 
8:1 J. CHINESE L. 1, 11 (1994). 
 36. Tsinghua Xuetang, which served as a preparatory school for Chinese students to pursue 
college education in the United States, was renamed Tsinghua School in 1912 and National Tsinghua 
University in 1928. HISTORY OF TSINGHUA, http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/newthuen/ 
newthuen_cnt/about-th/about-3.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 37. Zhou Gengsheng joined the Department of Political Science at Peking University in 1922 and 
Wang Huacheng, a former student of Quincy Wright, joined the Department of Political Science at 
Tshinghua University in 1928. He Qinhua, You Xue Ya Ou De Zhou Gengsheng: Zhong Guo Jin Dai 
Guo Ji Fa Zhi Fu, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.intellectual.com.cn/Returnee/StudentAbroadElite/ 
201001/377041.html; Wang Hua Cheng Qi Ren Qi Shi [Introduction to Wang Hua Cheng], 99:3 
ZHUAN JI WEN XUE [Biographical Literature] 69, 71–77 (2011).  
 38. Guo Ji Fa Da Gang [Outline of International Law], http://fashi.ecupl.edu.cn/ 
Article_Print.asp?ArticleID=217 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). See also http://sub.whu.edu.cn/dag/ 
wdxsh/xld/zhougengsheng.htm (in Chinese re Zhou). 
 39. Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and Public International Law, 8 DALHOUSIE 
L.J. 3, 11 (1984) (Can). 
 40. See generally JOHN ISRAEL, LIANDA: A CHINESE UNIVERSITY IN WAR AND REVOLUTION 
178–83 (1998). The Central Political School was the predecessor to NCCU. The National 
Southwestern Associated University (Lianda), which merged with Peking University, Tsinghua 
University and Nankai University, was set up in 1938. Id. at 124. The international law professors 
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while most international law professors relocated to Taiwan, some 
remained in Mainland China. Their intellectual history mirrors the 
evolution of modern China’s international law education. 
B. The Reform of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The ROC’s top-down measures in education transformed international 
law from a fringe discipline to an official discipline and contributed to 
modern China’s Grotian moment. The development of international law 
also served the government’s pragmatic needs. The role of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in promoting international law and cultivating 
first-generation international lawyers was critical. The MOFA of the ROC 
was built upon Zongli Yamen (Office of Foreign Affairs), the first 
centralized agency of international affairs that the Qing Court set up in 
1861.41 The Boxer Protocol mandated that the agency become “a Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Wai Wu Pu, which takes precedence over the six other 
Ministries of State.”42 The movement to reform the MOFA’s bureaucratic 
status was carried out by meeting foreign expectations of an efficient 
“single window” channel for diplomatic communication. 
Because none of the Qing officials selected from the imperial 
examination formally studied law, their successful execution of 
international law was confined to isolated incidents. For example, during 
the Prussian-Danish war, a Prussian battleship captured three Danish 
merchant ships in China’s Bo Hai Gulf in 1864.43 Based on Wanguo 
Gonfa, Zongli Yamen protested against this capture because of its 
violation of Chinese sovereignty over territorial seas.44 Prussia’s 
subsequent release and compensation for detaining the ships surprised the 
Qing government regarding the “usefulness” of international law. Yet, for 
most negotiations, strategic engagement in international law was beyond 
the Qing diplomats’ capabilities. The often-criticized notion of 
 
 
included Tsui Shu-chin in the Department of Political Science and Yan Shutang in the Department of 
Law. Id. at 183. Tsui also taught at NCCU. 
 41. Imperial Decree to Establish the Tsung-li Ya-men (Office of Foreign Affairs), BAI NIAN 
CHUAN CHENG ZOU CHU HUO LU: ZHONG HUA MIN GUO WAI JIAO SHI LIAO TE ZHAN [A Century of 
Resilient Tradition: Exhibition of the Republic of China’s Diplomatic Archives] 260 (2011).  
 42. Art. XII, Peace Agreement between the Great Powers and China (1901), available at 
http://www.deutsche-schutzgebiete.de/boxerprotocol.htm (last accessed June 14, 2015).  
 43. Chen, supra note 39, at 7; Tang, supra note 17, at 705. Li Zhaojie (James Li), The Impact of 
International Law on the Transformation of China’s Perception of the World: A Lesson from History, 
27 MD. J. INT’L L. 128, 134 (2012). 
 44. Li, supra note 43, at 135–38. The Qing government’s assertion on the territorial sea was 
influenced by the Chinese translations of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law. Id. at 136, 
137 n.44. 
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extraterritoriality exemplifies the problem. The consular jurisdiction 
granted to Western powers was “not [initially] construed as a derogation 
of sovereignty.”45 Instead, it was provided under a convenient assumption 
that barbarians should settle their own disputes without disturbing Chinese 
courts. 
The maturity of the ROC’s international law education propelled 
China’s first-generation international lawyers toward the world stage. 
These jurists have dominated in the diplomatic circle of various regimes, 
including the Provisional Government (Nanjing, 1912), the Beiyang 
Government (Beijing, 1912–28), the National Government (Nanjing and 
Chongqing, 1927–49) and the post-1949 Taipei Government.46 China’s 
first-generation international lawyers shared common features. Their 
cosmopolitan education in leading law schools and practice experience 
transformed the MOFA into an elite ministry. Their positions as the heads 
of states or foreign ministers enabled them to apply international law to 
negotiations without bureaucratic interference. 
The impact of international lawyers on Chinese diplomacy and 
international tribunals was significant. For instance, many “Yankeefied” 
ROC politicians, due to their substantial American education, fortified the 
ROC-US alliance over the course of more than a century.47 Wu Tingfang, 
a Hong Kong lawyer trained in Lincoln’s Inn, was China’s first 
international lawyer. He was involved in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
which ceded Taiwan to Japan, and subsequently sided with the ROC 
government.48 Chen Tien-hsi and Wang Chung-hui, graduates of 
University College London and Yale University respectively, served as 
PCIJ judges.49 Wang was also the first international lawyer to serve as the 
 
 
 45. Milton J. Helmick, United States Court for China, 14:18 FAR E. SURV. 252, 253 (1945). 
 46. See generally Hsu, The Rise of Modern China. The Guangzhou Military Government 
coexisted with the Beiyang Government from 1917 to 1927. 
 47. See STACEY BIELER, “PATRIOTS” OR “TRAITORS”? A HISTORY OF AMERICAN-EDUCATED 
CHINESE STUDENTS 167–68 (2004). 
 48. Wu Tingfang de Waijiao Shengya (Wu Tingfang’s Diplomatic Life), 56–76; 159–61. Wu 
Tingfang became acquainted with Guo Songtao, China’s first minister to the United Kingdom, and 
subsequently served as the legal advisor to Li Hongzhang, one of Qing’s most respected politicians. 
 49. Ole Spiermann, Judge Wang Chung-hui at the Permanent Court of International Justice, 5 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 115, 117 (2006). Among the ROC’s international lawyers, LL.B. graduates from 
Beiyang University (e.g., Wang Chung-hui and Yan Shutang) often pursued DCL or JSD degrees in 
the United States, while J.D. degrees in the US were common options for LL.B. graduates from 
Soochow University (e.g., John Wu and Ni Zhengyu) and graduates from Tsinghua School (e.g., 
Xiang Zhejun and Mei Ju-ao). Chen Tien-hsi graduated from UCL; see List of University College 
London People http://www.booksllc.net/sw2.cfm?q=List_of_University_College_London_people (last 
visited Oct. 19. 2014). Wang Chung-hui graduated from Yale; see Biographical Dictionary of Chinese 
Christianity, http://www.bdcconline.net/en/stories/w/wang-chonghui.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
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Chief Justice of the ROC Supreme Court.50 Hsu Mo and Wellington Koo, 
George Washington University and Columbia University-trained lawyers, 
became ICJ judges. Mei Ju-ao (J.D., Chicago) was appointed as the judge 
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo War Crimes 
Tribunal).51 John Wu (J.D., Michigan) was the principal drafter of the first 
ROC Constitution, in which a provision honoring “treaties and the Charter 
of the United Nations” was included in modern China’s constitution.52 
The international lawyers propelled the MOFA reform and revamped 
the image of Chinese diplomats. The first legal document that delineated 
the MOFA’s authority was the 1911 Organizational Outline of the ROC 
Provisional Government.53 Provisional President Sun Yat-sen appointed 
Wang Chung-hui as the first foreign minister of the new Republic. The 
Nanjing regime lasted only four months. The venue of foreign affairs 
power transferred to Beijing, the site of Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang 
Government. Interestingly, due to the Beiyang warlords’ disinterest and 
lack of ability in diplomacy, the MOFA became highly professionalized. 
Yuan’s promise not to intervene with the MOFA allowed the foreign 
minister, Lu Zhengxiang, to lay the groundwork for the ROC’s diplomatic 
system. 
Based on the Qing legacy and Lu’s reform, the Beiyang MOFA 
became the top ministry, and the foreign minister ascended to a critical 
position in the political hierarchy.54 In 1912, the Beijing Congress passed 
China’s first Organization Act of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wai 
Jiao Bu Guan Zhi), which detailed its constitutional mandate.55 Because 
managing treaty affairs was a priority for China, the ad hoc Treaty Study 
Commission (Tiao Yue Yan Jiu Kuai) was set up in 1912 and later evolved 
into the Department of Treaty (Tiao Yue Si).56 The Department, which was 
in charge of the LN-related treaties, remained the Ministry’s most 
important division. Lu’s reform also expedited the professionalization of 
Chinese diplomats. To avoid the nepotism that had affected the Qing 
 
 
 50. Id. at 117. 
 51. Robin I. Mordfin, Seeking the Past: Early Chinese Scholars at the Law School, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall12/chinesescholars (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 52. Li Xiuqing, translated by Nicholas Howson, John C. H. Wu at the University of Michigan 
School of Law, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 545, 545 (2008); ROC Constitution (1946), art. 141. The 1946 
ROC Constitution is therefore commonly referred to as the Wu version. 
 53. Li, supra note 33, at 99–100 (2006). 
 54. The Foreign Minister, who was nominated by the Prime Minister and was appointed by the 
President, would be the acting Prime Minister should the incumbent Prime Minister resign. 
 55. Li, supra note 33, at 99–100. 
 56. Id. at 101. The Department of Treaty was later renamed as the Department of Treaty and 
Legal Affairs under Article 3 of the 1984 Organization Act of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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envoys’ capacity in language skills and international law, Lu selected 
overseas Chinese students to join the government and introduced a 
diplomat examination.57 Wellington Koo, who then studied under 
Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University, was invited to be 
Yuan’s English language secretary.58 Hsu Mo also joined the Beiyang 
Government after passing the diplomat examination in 1919.59 These legal 
talents buttressed Lu’s efforts to modernize the Ministry.  
From 1928, Chiang Kai-shek’s National Government unified China 
and continued to enlist university professors to serve in government 
positions. The 1935 official records show that 25.6% and 30% of 86 
prominent diplomats were Ph.D. holders and lawyers, respectively.60 
During World War II, the ROC’s highest decision-making power was 
vested in the Supreme National Defense Council. Both the Council and the 
MOFA were dominated by international lawyers, such as Wang Chung-
hui and Wang Shijie. These international lawyer-governed agencies led to 
statism prevailing in the ROC’s international law approach. Although a 
Chinese equivalent to the United States Office of the Legal Advisers never 
emerged in the ROC, the international lawyers serving as professional 
diplomats enhanced the legalist approach to diplomacy. The tradition of 
scholar-bureaucrats and the revolving door between academia and the 
government remains in today’s Taiwan. International lawyers’ close 
association with higher education also contributed to the development of 
international law as a professional and intellectual discipline in the ROC. 
C. International Law Societies and Mixed Court Experiences 
International law education and the MOFA reform accelerated the 
modernization of the ROC’s legal capacity. The formation of international 
law societies and the Shanghai Mixed Court further raised public 
 
 
 57. LI YANGFAN, GUOHEN: MIN GUO WAI JIAO ER SHI REN [Laments for the Country: 20 People 
in ROC Diplomacy] 26–29 (2010). The ROC’s diplomat examination was based on the 1912 
Provisional Rules on the Diplomat and Consular Examination, 1915 Diplomat and Consular 
Examination Ordinance, and the 1919 Diplomat and Consular Examination Law. YUE QIANHOU, MIN 
GUO WAI JIAO GUAN REN SHI JI ZHI YAN JIU [Study on the Human Resources Development 
Mechanism of ROC Diplomats] 25 (2004). 
 58. JONATHAN CLEMENTS, WELLINGTON KOO: CHINA 31, 174 (2008). John Bassett Moore was 
Columbia’s first full professor of international law. Id. at 31. 
 59. Wang Dingxian, Guo Ji Fa Yuan Da Fa Guan Xu Mo Sheng Ping, Can Yu De Guo Ji Fa 
Yuan An Jian, Zhe Shu, Jian Ping [ICJ Judge Hsu Mo’s Life, ICJ Cases, Publications and Comments], 
9 ZHONG GUO GUO JI SI FA YU BI JIAO FA NIAN KAN [Chinese Yearbook of Private International Law 
and Comparative Law] 504, 504–06 (2006). See also http://www.tju.edu.cn/tjupaper/every_lib/ 
20111110/104504/201111/t20111111_115542.htm. 
 60. YUE, supra note 57, at 159–66.  
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awareness of international law’s significance in Chinese diplomacy. While 
international law societies in the north of the country influenced political 
thinking, the Mixed Court in the South exposed Chinese judges and 
lawyers to cases with substantive foreign components. These experiences 
greatly advanced the legal sophistication of the ROC’s international 
lawyers. 
The participation of Qing officials in the London-based International 
Law Association (ILA) was China’s first encounter with the Western 
concept of international law societies.61 Founded as the Association for the 
Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations in 1873, the ILA remains 
one of the world’s most esteemed international law societies.62 Guo 
Songtao, the Qing’s first minister appointed to the United Kingdom, and 
Japanese minister, Ueno Kagenori, were both invited to attend the ILA 
meeting in 1878.63 Both Guo and his successor, Marquis Zeng Jize, were 
subsequently elected to be ILA honorary secretaries.64 Their ILA 
experiences introduced them to the vast scope of international law and 
fortified their belief in “importing” additional international law knowledge 
to China. Later, in Changsha of Hunan Province, the Public Law 
Association (Gong Fa Xue Hui) and the Law Association (Fa Lv Xue Hui) 
emerged as China’s first international law societies.65 They were both 
established in 1898, with the primary goal of increasing the international 
law understanding necessary for revising treaties.66 These societies 
preceded the American Society of International Law and the Netherlands 
Society of International Law that were founded in 1906 and 1910, 
respectively.67 Nonetheless, the two Chinese societies soon ceased 
operation because of the failure of the Guangxu Emperor’s short-lived 
reform. 
Akin to education and the MOFA reform, the top-down approach 
influenced the formation of international law societies in the ROC. Lu 
 
 
 61. HSU, CHINA’S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS, at 199–207. 
 62. Cecil J. Olmstead, The International Law Association: A World-wide Organization for 
Development and Promotion of International Law, 43 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 18, 18 (1973). 
 63. HSU, supra note 23, at 206–07. 
 64. Id. at 207. 
 65. LIN, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
 66. Id. 
 67. JANIS, supra note 29, at 149; Nico J. Schrijver, A Missionary Burden or Enlightened Self-
interest? International Law in Dutch Foreign Policy, 57:2 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 209, 210 (2010); 
http://www.asil.org/about/asil-history. The Japanese Society of International Law, which continues to 
exist today, was founded in 1897. Yoshiro Matsui, The Social Science of International Law: Its 
Evolution in Japan, No. 45, 2002 JAPANESE ANNUL INT’L L. 1, 1. Nico J. Schrijver, A Missionary 
Burden on Enlightened Self-Interest? International Law in Dutch Foreign Policy, NILR 2010, vol 
57:2, 209, 210, available at http://www.asil.org/about/asil-history. 
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Zhengxiang, the key Beiyang reformer of the MOFA, initiated the 
International Law Society (ILS) in 1913.68 As a Qing envoy to the first 
two Hague Peace Conferences, Lu apprehended the strategic importance 
of implementing the treaties on the resolution of international disputes and 
the laws of war.69 British and American proposals to exclude 
extraterritorial disputes from the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) prompted him to urge the Qing Court to expedite legal 
reform.70 To increase Chinese influence on the Court, the Qing 
government nominated several PCA members, including Wu Tingfang and 
former Belgium Minister of State, Jules Van den Heuvel.71 With Wang 
Chung-hui’s support, Lu founded the ILS, which aimed to prepare the 
ROC to actively take part in the Third Peace Conference and to strengthen 
the country’s standing as a civilized nation.72 Although the conference 
never took place due to WWI, the attempt to enter the family of nations as 
a civilized nation invigorated official support in building the international 
law capacity.73 
Remarkably, based on a proposal by the US Minister to China, Paul S. 
Reinsch, Lu Zhengxiang and Wellington Koo established the Chinese 
Social and Political Science Association (CSPSA) in Beijing in 1915.74 
The CSPSA, modeled on the American Political Science Association, 
became China’s first academic society of political science.75 While the 
 
 
 68. The International Law Society lasted from 1913 to 1916. Chi-hua Tang, Qing Mo Min Chu 
Zhong Guo Dui Hai Ya Bao He Hui Zhi Can Yu (1899–1917) [A Study on China’s Participation of the 
Hague Peace Conferences, 1899–1917], 23 GUO LI ZHENG ZHI DA XUE LI SHI XUE BAO [NCCU J. 
History] 45, 72–73 (2005); http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/16885/1/%E6%B8%85% 
E6%9C%AB%E6%B0%91%E5%88%9D%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E5%B0%8D%E3%80%8C%
E6%B5%B7%E7%89%99%E4%BF%9D%E5%92%8C%E6%9C%83%E3%80%8D%E4%B9%8B%E5
%8F%83%E8%88%87(1899-1917%EF%BC%89-%E5%94%90%E5%95%9F%E8%8F%AF.pdf. 
 69. Tang, supra note 68, at 47–65. These conventions, which represented China’s first 
participation in multilateral treaties, include the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes and the Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  
 70. Id. at 62, 67. For the background of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), see David 
Caron, War and International Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 4, 15–17 (2000). 
 71. Tang, supra note 68, at 69, 70 n.151. Belgium was a neutral state and Jules Van den Heuvel 
was a prominent jurist. He was the only foreign national that the Chinese governments nominated as a 
member of the PCA. 
 72. Id. at 73. With President Yuan Shikai’s support, Lu also organized the Preparatory Society 
for the Third Hague Conference (Bao He Hui Zhun Bei Hui), which convened in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs from 1912 to 1915. Id. at 73–74. 
 73. Id. at 81–83. 
 74. See The Origin of the Association [Editorial Note], 1 CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 
(1916) (describing that on December 5, 1915, 65 members attended the first meeting that took place at 
the residence of Lou Tseng-tsiang, then the Foreign Minister). 
 75. Id. at 1.  
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CSPSA was not an international law society per se, the majority of its 
work concerned “international law and diplomacy.”76 The waning of the 
ILS and its overlapping membership with the CSPSA made the latter the 
most prominent academic society for promoting international law in 
China.77 The direct involvement of Reinsch, together with Professor W. F. 
Willoughby of Princeton University and Professor Henry C. Adams of the 
University of Michigan, also enhanced American influence in the elite 
circle of Chinese diplomats.78 
While Beijing-based academic institutions promoted international law 
research, the growth of the legal profession and the Mixed Court enabled 
ROC legal talents to familiarize themselves with Western adjudication 
mechanisms. Modeled after Japan’s Barristers Law, the 1912 Provisional 
Regulations on Lawyers governed the qualification and disciplinary 
procedures for the legal profession.79 By the 1930s, the Shanghai Bar 
Association became the nation’s largest bar association.80 Shanghai 
became a commercial and legal hub because of its flourishing legal 
market, galvanized by large foreign law firms and high-stakes commercial 
litigation.81 The law schools of the English-speaking Soochow University 
and the French-speaking Aurora University also made the city an 
intellectual center of comparative law.82 
The Mixed Court system that continued from the 1860s to 1927 made 
Shanghai’s legal landscape increasingly complex.83 The territorial and 
personal jurisdiction under the multiplicity of courts was the most 
challenging legal experiment on Chinese soil.84 The Shanghai International 
Settlement, which co-existed with the French Concession, constituted 
 
 
 76. Id.; James Brown Scott, The Chinese Social and Political Science Association, 10:2 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 375, 376 (1916). 
 77. See Editorial Note, supra note 74, at 9. 
 78. See Scott, supra note 76, at 375, 377.  
 79. XIAOQUN XU, CHINESE PROFESSIONALS AND THE REPUBLICAN STATE: THE RISE OF 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN SHANGHAI 1912–1937 108 (2001). 
 80. See Alison W. Conner, Lawyers and the Legal Profession during the Republican Period, in 
CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 215, 229, 237 (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip C. C. Huang 
eds., 1994) (“[B]y the end of 1916, 58 of the 122 lawyers registered [in the International Mixed Court] 
were Chinese.”). 
 81. Hou, Xinyi Min Guo Shi Qi Lv Shi Shi Ru He Jing Zheng De, http://www.rmlt.com.cn/ 
2013/1022/168521.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 82. Aurora University was known as Zhendan Daxue. Alison W. Conner, The Comparative Law 
School of China, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. 
COHEN (C. Stephen Hsu ed. 2003) 210, 222–25 (2003). 
 83. See XU, supra note 79, at 229; THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN CHINA: 
THE SHANGHAI MIXED COURT 1911–27 vii–xi (1992). 
 84. Lee, Tahirih V. Risky Business: Courts, Culture, and the Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1335–414, 1362 (1993). 
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large exclaves of the extraterritorial zone.85 The treaty right of consular 
jurisdiction granted to foreigners gave them immunity from Chinese 
jurisdiction. For example, the United States Court for China and the 
British Supreme Court for China and Japan were conferred jurisdiction 
over US and UK citizens, respectively.86 Legally speaking, unlike with 
colonies, China did not lose its sovereignty over the Shanghai 
International Settlement. The Chinese government continued to exercise 
jurisdiction over Chinese and non-treaty foreigners (i.e. nationals of 
countries that were not accorded extraterritorial rights). Consequently, to 
deal with cases involving Chinese and non-treaty foreign defendants, the 
Mixed Court was set up.87 The “mixed” nature of the Court meant that 
Chinese magistrates and foreign consular representatives, known as 
foreign assessors, jointly tried the cases.88 The presence of foreign judges 
and lawyers with diverse nationalities in a single case became the norm. 
Importantly, the Mixed Court’s establishment was based on 
convenience rather than on treaty rights. None of the treaties gave foreign 
consulates the power to appoint judges to the Court. As the British 
government acknowledged, the sole “legal” basis for the Court’s 
foundation was President Yuan Shikai’s 1913 declaration to permit the 
continuity of existing foreign “privileges and immunities” based on 
“established usages.”89 Western-educated ROC judges opposed such an 
interpretation. The ROC Supreme Court eventually found that due to the 
absence of a legal foundation, the cases decided by the de facto Mixed 
Court lacked legal effect and, therefore, “a plea of res judicata [could not] 
be entertained” in Chinese courts.90 
Notwithstanding the legal challenges to the Mixed Court and its non-
recognition of stare decisis, its jurisprudence demonstrated the salient 
impact of legal cases on the nation.91 In 1925, the Beiyang government 
was required to apply for an injunction against the Mixed Court’s order to 
 
 
 85. See STEPHENS, supra note 83, at xi (“In 1925, the [population of the] settlement . . . 
numbered 30,000 foreigners and 810,000 Chinese.”); Manley O. Hudson, The Rendition of the 
International Mixed Court at Shanghai, 21:3 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 451 (1927) (introducing the 
population of the Shanghai International Settlement and the bordering French Concession). 
 86. Hudson, supra note 85, at 454; see also Helmick, supra note 45, 252 (“A person accused of 
crime was tried in the court of his nationality.”). 
 87. The French Mixed Court was also established in the French Concession and had jurisdiction 
over French nationals. See also Wang, supra note 7, at 255–57 (explaining the origin of Shanghai-
based foreign courts). 
 88. See Hudson, supra note 85, at 460. 
 89. STEPHENS, supra note 83, at 69–70. 
 90. Case Brought on Appeal from Kiangsi 16th Day 3rd Month, 6th Year of the Chinese 
Republic, cited in id. at 70–71. 
 91. Id. at 93–94. 
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destruct certain ammunition in Shanghai.92 In the following year, the 
Mixed Court dealt with the Netherlands’ request to extradite a German 
national who had committed crimes in Dutch Java.93 The Court declined 
the request on the ground that the Netherlands-China treaties confined 
extradition to Dutch citizens.94 These complex cases made Shanghai a 
training ground for China’s first-generation international lawyers. Ni 
Zhengyu, a graduate of Soochow and Stanford Universities, was a 
prominent example. Before Ni was appointed as the Chief Advisor to the 
ROC Prosecutor Group in the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, he gained 
substantial experiences as a commercial lawyer and judge in Shanghai.95 
III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE ROC’S DIPLOMACY 
This Article has explored the evolution of the international law 
discipline and the cultivation of international lawyers in the ROC. With 
the guiding civilized nation concept, the ROC’s international lawyers took 
the positivist stance on international law and adopted the legalist approach 
to tackle diplomatic obstacles.96 Other than the Republican Chinese 
characteristics of statism and pragmatism, idealism developed into a 
conspicuous feature of ROC diplomacy. The ROC’s international lawyers 
contributed both to modern China’s Grotian moment and to twentieth 
century international lawmaking in East Asia. The ROC’s assertive 
legalism approach was evidenced in the revision of unequal treaties and in 
its participation in international organizations and courts. Based on these 
case studies, thie Article challenges the view of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) that the ROC succumbed to imperialism.97 By demonstrating 
the ROC international lawyers’ strategic engagement with international 
law, this Article will also demonstrate that their intellectual influence 
shaped the global order. 
 
 
 92. Hudson, supra note 85, at 454. 
 93. Consul-General for the Netherlands v. Weidemann, Shanghai Mixed Court (1926). Id. at 96. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Ni Zhengyu was elected as the first PRC judge of the ICJ. Ling Yan, In Memoriam: Ni 
Zhengyu, 3 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 693, 693–95 (2004). Other international lawyers’ experiences in 
Shanghai, see Conner, supra note 80, at 234. 
 96. The ROC’s international law-based approach is distinct from the early PRC’s political, 
radical position on diplomacy, which led to more than two-decade isolation of Mainland China. See 
William C. Kirby, The Internalization of China: Foreign Relations at Home and Abroad in the 
Republican Era, 150 CHINA Q. 433, 441 (1997) (discussing the ROC’s legalist approach to 
diplomacy). 
 97. See, e.g., Report to the 2nd National Congress of Worker’s and Peasant’s Representatives 
(Jan. 23, 1934) (arguing that the Chinese Nationalist Party “surrenders completely to imperialism”). 
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A. The Treaty Revision Campaign 
The revision of unequal treaties was a major impetus in the 
professionalization of international law in modern China. In fact, the 
strategy of the ROC’s international lawyers to tackle the issue of unequal 
treaties represented a major landmark in the nation’s legal capacity 
building. Importantly, the notion of unequal treaties did not originate from 
the West because none of the early translations of Western books alluded 
to such a concept.98 The term “unequal treaties” seems to have first 
appeared in the 1923 KMT declaration that condemned the Qing 
Dynasty’s conclusion of such treaties and pledged to “restore China’s free 
and equal status.”99 Thereafter the term became popular and buttressed 
Chinese nationalism, enabling the CCP to use the “century of humiliation” 
slogan as a powerful weapon against the West and the KMT.100 
1. The Concept of Unequal Treaties 
The peace treaties with the Netherlands and Russia, discussed 
previously, were not considered unequal. The concept of unequal treaties 
began with the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing with the United Kingdom. The 
common features of unequal treaties included the rights of 
extraterritoriality, leased territories, the stationing of troops, and 
navigation on inland waters.101 These privileges were “unequal” because 
they encroached upon Chinese sovereignty. This Article, nonetheless, 
offer a different view. Certain rights that the Western powers requested 
were to remedy their unfair treatment in China. For example, the Treaty of 
Wanghia, the first unequal treaty with the United States, mandated the 
abolition of the Chinese practice banning foreigners from learning 
Chinese.102 The Treaty of Tianjin prohibited Chinese official documents 
 
 
 98. Hungdah Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal 
Treaties, in CHINA’S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239, 241–46 (Jerome 
A. Cohen ed. 1972). 
 99. See id. at 245–46 (discussing various Chinese Nationalist Party declarations on the 
abrogation of unequal treaties).  
 100. Note that the abrogation of unequal treaties was also major feature of the National 
Government’s political platform. See How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History, http://www. 
theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878/ (last 
accessed June 1, 2015)  
 101. See Wang, supra note 7, at 252–53 (listing the rights and privileges under unequal treaties). 
 102. Treaty of Peace, Amity, and Commerce, Between the United States of America and the 
Chinese Empire, U.S.-China, art. XVIII, July 3, 1844. 
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from referring to the British as “barbarians.”103 Arguably, the treaty right 
of extraterritoriality that Chinese intellectuals often condemned was not 
based on an imperialist intention,104 rather, it protected foreigners from 
suffering the effects of Qing criminal proceedings that often forced 
confession by torture. On the “positive” side, foreign powers in the 
respective treaties promised to relinquish extraterritoriality should China 
revamp its legal system to be on par with Western standards.105 This treaty 
obligation, along with the experiences in the two Hague Peace 
Conferences, prompted modern China to expedite its legal reform. 
The attempt to end the unequal treaty system posed a complex legal 
challenge. The system, intertwined with the most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment, started China on a vicious cycle. Although the MFN clause was 
not conventionally understood as part of unequal treatment, this 
procedural requirement was more detrimental than other substantive treaty 
rights. Under Article 8 of the 1843 Treaty of the Bogue, the Chinese 
Emperor agreed that any “additional privileges or immunities” granted to 
other nations would be extended to British subjects.106 It was the prelude 
to the unilateral, instead of reciprocal, MFN provision that subsequent 
treaties included.107 The unequal treaties system became a locked-in 
regime. Based on the MFN claim, the United Kingdom enlarged its 
consular jurisdiction in accordance with a subsequent US treaty; 
moreover, Mexico and Switzerland could gain extraterritoriality despite 
the absence of such a treaty arrangement.108 The legal effect of unequal 
 
 
 103. Peace Treaty between the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of China. U.K.-China, 
June 26, 1858, art. LI; see also LIU, supra note 8, at 31–51 (analyzing “the birth of a super-sign” under 
Sino-British treaties). Page numbers do not match with source. 
 104. See Matthew Craven, What Happed to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal 
Empire, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 335, 346 (2005). 
 105. E.g., UK-China Commercial Treaty (1902), art. 12; Treaty Between the United States and 
China for the Extension of Commercial Relations Between Them, U.S.-China, art. XV, Oct. 8, 1903. 
The 1902 treaty is cited correctly. A minor problem: While the cited article mentioned the 1903 treaty, 
it does not provide the specific citation “art. 15” as the author does here. UK treaty, I don’t have the 
English version, Chinese version, see attached article (in Chinese) by Chen Yaping, p 1; US treaty, see 
http://www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/209. 
 106. Supplementary Treaty of Hooman Chai (The Bogue), U.K.-China, art. XIII. The Treaty of 
the Bogue was the supplemental treaty to the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing. 
 107. In the modern trade regime, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) requirement accords reciprocal 
treatment. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), art. I; for an analysis of a modern 
MFN clause’s application in international disputes. See generally Locknie Hsu, MFN and Dispute 
Settlement: When the Twain Meet, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 25, 25–37 (2006). 
 108. For example, Article 25 of the Treaty of Wanghia extended consular jurisdiction from 
disputes between US and Chinese nationals to those between US and non-Chinese nationals. Hence, 
Chinese courts lost complete jurisdiction over cases involving Americans. On the MFN basis, UK 
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treaties has been controversial, as the unequal nature can be due to force or 
various types of coercion.109 The positivist approach of the ROC’s 
international lawyers was demonstrated by their non-denial of the unequal 
treaties’ validity and by their seeking of the legal justification to revise or 
abrogate such treaties.110 Distinct from ROC jurists, early PRC decision-
makers simply considered unequal treaties void ad initio and failed to 
develop a consistent legal approach to the treaty regime.111 
2. Three Legal Approaches 
Upholding the civilized nation principle, the ROC did not directly 
challenge the normative value of the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. To 
circumvent this doctrine, the ROC’s international lawyers resorted to three 
approaches. The application of their legalist efforts, which ended the 
unequal treaties regime, not only elevated China’s international status, but 
also demonstrated its statism and pragmatism. First, based on the 
suggestion of foreign legal counsel to the Beiyang Government, the ROC 
declared war against Germany and Austria-Hungary during WWI.112 The 
goal underlying this opportunistic declaration of war was to invalidate 
Chinese treaties with these powers.113 In addition to declaring the bilateral 
treaties invalid, the ROC revoked the extraterritorial privileges of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary and took over German concessions in 
Tianjin and Hankou.114 The ROC also disarmed enemy troops and 
 
 
clause in their treaties. See Albert H. Putney & Raymond L. Buell, The Termination of Unequal 
Treaties, 21 PROC. AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. AT ITS ANNUAL MEETING 87, 96 (1927). 
 109. The current view under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) is 
that a treaty is void if it was “procured by the threat or use of force in violation of international law.” 
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 619 (7th ed. 2008). Yet, this position 
does not render the previous unequal treaties void. Moreover, it does not govern the validity of treaties 
signed under other types of pressure. Id.. See generally Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal 
Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire, 73 NORD 3, 335–82 (2005). 
 110. Chiu, supra note 98, at 267. 
 111. Id. at 259, 267. 
 112. China declared war against Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917. The Beiyang 
Government’s foreign legal experts included Georges Padoux, Jean Escarra and Westel W. 
Willoughby. Lin-chun Wu, 1923 Nian Beijng Zheng Fu Fei Chu “Zhong Ri Min Si Tiao Yue” Zhi Fa 
Li Su Qiu [Appealing to Legal Procedure: China’s Endeavour to Abolish the Twenty-One Demands in 
1923], 3 XIN SHI XUE [New History] 157, 175–76 (2008). 
 113. See generally Arnold Pronto, The Effect of War on Law—What Happens to Their Treaties 
When States Go to War? 2:2 CAM. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227, 230 (2013) (explaining this traditional 
view no longer reflects current international law due to the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact).  
 114. Zhen-Feng Cai, Zhong Guo Shou Guan De Ao Shi Guan Wei Dui Ji Jun Xie Zhi Yan Jiu 
(1917–1922) [The Research of China’s Takeover of German and Austro-Hungarian Embassy Guards 
and Weapons], in GUO JI FA ZAI ZHONG GUO DE QUAN SHI YU YFUN YONG [The Interpretation and 
Application of International Law in China] 81, 97–101 (Hui Min Zhou ed., 2012).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:87 
 
 
 
 
accommodated them as prisoners of war in compliance with the 1899 
Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land.115 The 
ROC’s compliance with the Convention, which the Qing Court ratified 
following the First Hague Peace Conference, showed the nation’s 
adherence to the civilized nation standard. These experiences constituted 
the ROC’s first trial for abolishing foreign privileges and the first 
implementation of the laws of war in China.116 
Second, the Chinese Senate claimed the absence of congressional 
ratification as a justification to invalidate the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 
1915, which were commonly known as the “Twenty-One Demands.”117 
Such demands compelled the Beiyang Government to confirm Japan’s 
“succession” to German rights over Shandong at the end of WWI.118 Since 
Japan insisted on the validity of the treaties, the ROC’s attempt to abolish 
the 1915 treaties at the Paris Peace Conference was futile.119 The Chinese 
delegation refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles because Article 156 of 
the Treaty mandated the transfer of German rights in Shandong to 
Japan.120 In 1923, the ROC Senate passed a resolution invalidating the 
1915 treaties.121 In the Senate’s view, such treaties should be void ab initio 
because they lacked congressional ratification.122 The claim, based on 
President Yuan Shikai’s incompetence to conclude the treaties alone, 
marked China’s first challenge to the treaties’ validity on a domestic 
constitutional procedure ground. Yet, this claim was problematic from the 
international and constitutional law perspective. 
Article 35 of the 1912 ROC Provisional Constitution made 
congressional concurrence a condition for the conclusion of treaties. 
However, Yuan replaced the 1912 Provisional Constitution with the 1914 
Provisional Constitution, which enlarged the president’s treaty-making 
power.123 The 1914 Provisional Constitution conferred to the president 
sole treaty power unless a treaty involved a “territorial change” or an 
 
 
 115. Id. at 86, 98. 
 116. Germany relinquished rights and privileges under the 1921 peace treaty with the ROC. 
 117. Madeleine Chi, China Diplomacy, 1914–1918, 88 (1970). 
 118. During WWI, Japan declared war against Germany and occupied the Shandong Peninsula. 
After the war, Japan requested that the German concessions in Shandong be transferred to Japan. 
 119. Tang, supra note 17, at 710; see also STEPHEN G. CRAFT, V.K. WELLINGTON KOO AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF MODERN CHINA 51 (2004) (explaining Wellington Koo’s call for direct return of 
Qingdao on the ground of rebus sic stantibus because China’s declaration of war ended the German 
leases). 
 120. Based on Washington’s mediation, Japan agreed to return Shandong to China at the 1922 
Washington Naval Conference. 
 121. Wu, supra note 112, at 170. 
 122. Id. at 171. 
 123. Id. at 179. 
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“increase of the burden of nationals.”124 Neither condition applied to the 
1915 treaties because concessions in Shandong were still deemed Chinese 
territory and the burden on nationals was not increased. It may be argued 
that the 1914 Provisional Constitution itself was invalid because Yuan’s 
decision to dissolve the original congress was unconstitutional. The 
weakness of such a claim lies in the fact that Yuan’s administration was 
considered China’s sole legitimate government and that the country’s 
internal political changes could not affect the validity of treaties. Albeit 
unsuccessful, the claim represented the congressional approach to treaty 
revision. During WWII, the National Government’s 1941 declaration of 
war terminated all treaties with Japan, including the Sino-Japanese 
Treaties of 1915.125 
Finally, the most broad-ranging claim against unequal treaties was the 
reliance on rebus sic stantibus (a fundamental change of circumstances) 
that Zhou Gengsheng actively advocated.126 He believed that incomplete 
congressional ratification did not constitute a sufficient basis for 
terminating the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915. Instead, rebus sic 
stantibus would have enabled China to assert a vital change of 
circumstances that warranted the denunciation of the treaties. As the threat 
of Germany and Russia to East Asia lessened substantially, the extension 
of the Japanese lease over Liushun and Dalian could not be justified. As a 
result of political changes it had undergone since the conclusion of the 
treaties in 1915, China could no longer permit foreign concessions in its 
territory. Furthermore, the rebus sic stantibus principle was enshrined in 
Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (League Covenant) 
and prompted the return of Weihaiwei, a British colony in Shandong, to 
China in 1930.127 
Both the Beiyang Government and the National Government resorted 
to revision clauses in treaties and the principle of rebus sic stantibus as the 
basis for renegotiating the treaties. The ROC’s invalidation of the 1865 
Sino-Belgium Treaty was a key case. After the ROC government 
unilaterally terminated the treaty, Belgium brought a complaint against 
 
 
 124. Id. at 179, 
 125. Remarks by President Ma Ying-jeou at the Opening Ceremony of the Special Exhibition on 
the 60th Anniversary of the Coming into Force of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China 
and Japan, Taipai Representative Office in Greece, available at http://www.roc-taiwan.org/ 
GR/fp.asp?xItem=319723&ctNode=8128&mp=527 (last accessed June 15, 2014).  
 126. See Tang, supra note 17, at 707. See Chiu, supra note 98, at 255 n.64 (discussing that other 
ROC scholars held the same view). 
 127. The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, The Covenant of the 
League of Nations, art. 19, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art19 (last visited May 
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China before the PCIJ.128 Belgium argued that Article 46 of the treaty 
solely conferred onto Belgium the right to revise the treaty and that China 
had no right to denunciate it.129 In anticipation of the PCIJ proceedings, 
China intended to rely on rebus sic stantibus as its major defense.130 As 
UK-led Western powers attempted to improve ties with Chiang’s National 
Government, Belgium reluctantly agreed to the ROC’s request for treaty 
revision and withdrew its complaint from the PCIJ.131 The renegotiated 
1928 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Belgium became the precedent 
for China’s treaty revisions. In the middle of WWII, marked by new 
treaties with the United States and Britain that abolished extraterritoriality, 
all unequal treaties were abolished in 1943.132 Correspondingly, foreign 
concessions and the Mixed Court ended. Since the 1842 Treaty of 
Nanjing, it took China’s international lawyers a hundred years to achieve 
the goal of treaty revision. Their unyielding attempts to end the unequal 
treaty regime negated the PRC’s pro-imperialist argument against the 
ROC. 
B. Participation in International Institutions 
The ROC’s legalist approach to unequal treaties demonstrated the 
international lawyers’ positivist stance on international law. The strategy 
of assertive legalism escalated further with China’s participation in the 
multilateral rule-making process. These experiences facilitated the 
transformation of the once Eurocentric law of nations to universally valid 
normative claims. Moreover, influenced by US President Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the idealism of the ROC’s international law 
approach contributed to its Grotian moment that remains critical to current 
global governance.133  
 
 
 128. See Craven, supra note 104, at 368–69 (discussing the argument and court proceedings). 
 129. Tang, supra note 17, at 708. 
 130. See id. Four foreign legal experts, Walther Schücking, Giuseppe Motta, Nicholas Politis and 
Robert Lansing, advised the Beiyang Government to defend the case on the basis of rebus sic 
stantibus. Id. 
 131. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium (Belg. v. 
China), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8 (Order of May 25). 
 132. Putney & Buell, supra note 108, at 97–98 (listing the countries that relinquished 
extraterritorial rights in China). See supra note 41, at 156. 
 133. Point I (open covenants of peace) and Point XIV (political independence and territorial 
integrity) were particularly pertinent to the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915. At the Paris Peace 
Conference, the Chinese delegation intended to rely on Wilsonianism to resolve the Shandong 
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1. From the League of Nations to the United Nations 
The ROC was a founding member of the LN, which was established 
as a result of the Paris Peace Conference.134 Wellington Koo served as the 
chairman of the League Council, in which China was a non-permanent 
member.135 Unlike with unequal treaties, the Manchurian incident 
illustrated the ROC’s initial efforts to turn the international treaties into a 
shield to protect the nation. To respond to Japanese aggression in 
Manchuria and to the creation of Manchukuo in the 1930s, Koo advised 
the government to appeal to the LN on the basis of Articles X, XI, and XV 
of the League Covenant.136 To garner support from the United States, a 
non-member of the LN, the ROC asserted that the Japanese invasion 
violated the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact 
(Pact of Paris).137 These two agreements, to which Japan, the United States 
and the ROC were signatories, respectively ensured China’s territorial 
integrity and outlawed war as an instrument of foreign policy.138 The 
League Covenant, along with the two treaties, constituted the ROC’s legal 
basis for the complaint against Japan. 
These well-devised claims prompted Washington to adopt the Stimson 
Doctrine, which confirmed the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur (law 
does not arise from injustice) by declining to recognize territorial changes 
by force.139 Japan’s British legal adviser, Thomas Baty, devised the 
justification of Japan’s right of self-defense in Manchuria;140 however, 
such a defense could not stand. It encountered fierce criticism from both 
foreign and Japanese scholars. A prominent scholar opposing the official 
argument was Kisaburo Yokota, who became Japan’s first international 
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 135. Tang, supra note 17, at 719. 
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lawyer sitting on the postwar Supreme Court.141 Some may argue that the 
Stimson Doctrine and the LN’s adoption of the Lytton Report, which 
condemned Japanese military action, were futile.142 This Article disagrees. 
It is true that these efforts neither deterred Japanese aggression nor 
prevented Japan’s departure from the LN. Nonetheless, the ROC’s legal 
strategy that effectively isolated Japan and gained moral support from the 
allies proved to be crucial for China’s final victory. 
In addition to the Manchuria issue, the Republican Chinese 
characteristics of statism, pragmatism and idealism dominated China’s 
wartime policy. The ROC’s declaration of war exemplified statism and 
pragmatism. At the inception of the Japanese invasion in 1937, the 
National Government only issued the Proclamation of Self-Defense and 
War of Resistance. It did not declare war against the Axis powers until the 
US Congress declared war on Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. 
In the interim de facto war period, neither Japan nor the ROC declared war 
on each other or terminated diplomatic ties. Based on international 
lawyers’ advice, Generalissimo Chiang made this heavily-criticized 
decision.143 Their greatest concern was that the legal effect of the 
declaration of war would enable Japan to exercise the belligerent’s right of 
visit and search on the high seas.144 The exercise of this right would 
effectively cut off the supply of arms and ammunition to China by ships of 
neutral states through ports in Vietnam and Myanmar.145 This was a matter 
of survival because most Chinese harbors were already occupied by Japan. 
Furthermore, due to the US Neutrality Acts, the Chinese military could not 
receive American arms should the ROC become a belligerent.146 Given its 
 
 
 141. Id. at 330; Takeso Shimoda, In Memoriam: Dr. Kisaburo Yokota (1896–1993), 36 JAPANESE 
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fragile military power, the ROC’s long-overdue declaration of war in 
tandem with Washington and London was a pragmatic approach to ensure 
multilateral support. 
During WWII, the idealism of the ROC foreign policy quickly 
advanced. It was this characteristic that made China’s first-generation 
international lawyers more Wilsonian than their Western counterparts and 
led to the ROC’s “Grotian moment.” The issuance of visas by the ROC 
Consulate in Vienna to Jewish persons illustrated this point.147 Because of 
these “visas for life,” more than 2,000 Jews escaped Nazi-controlled 
Austria and sought refuge in Shanghai.148 The ROC’s decision was 
unprecedented, particularly compared to the position of 32 countries in the 
1938 Evian Conference.149 Most Western nations were reluctant to accept 
Jewish refugees.150 
The ROC’s policy on Korea similarly evidenced idealism. During 
WWII, the ROC provided financial support to the Provisional Government 
of the Republic of Korea, which was based in Shanghai and subsequently 
relocated to Chongqing. Chinese diplomatic recognition of the Provisional 
Government also showed the ROC’s support for Japanese-occupied Korea. 
In 1943, three heads of states, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chiang 
Kai-shek and Winston Churchill, convened at the Cairo Conference to 
discuss the common stance of the Allies against Japan.151 At the 
Conference, Wang Chung-hui, the legal advisor to Chiang, fiercely 
opposed the British proposal.152 In London’s view, the joint declaration 
only needed to state that Korean and Chinese territories should be separate 
from Japanese rule without mentioning their final ownership.153 At the 
ROC’s insistence, the final version of the Cairo Declaration mandated that 
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“Korea shall be free and independent” and that Manchuria and Taiwan 
“shall be returned to the Republic of China.”154 These provisions enabled 
the Cairo Declaration to be the foundation for Asia’s postwar order. 
The ROC’s international lawyers also profoundly influenced postwar 
multilateral institutions. A preliminary, yet paramount, debate concerned 
China’s own status as one of the Big Four on par with the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Russia. While Wang Shijie opposed the position, 
Wang Chung-hui and Wellington Koo determined that the Big Four status 
would raise China’s international standing.155 Among the Allies, Britain 
and Russia objected to the ROC’s Big Four status, since they deemed 
China a “secondary power and preferred to place priority on Europe.”156 
Yet, they reluctantly succumbed to Roosevelt’s insistence on China’s 
status. As Article 23 of the UN Charter enshrines, the ROC, a founding 
member of the UN, became one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council.157 
The ROC’s idealism culminated in the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks 
Conversations and the 1945 San Francisco Conference that created the UN 
and the ICJ. To a certain extent, even the US delegates claimed that the 
ROC “placed too much faith in international law.”158 Other powers 
disagreed with the ROC’s proposals for creating a permanent international 
police force and conferring compulsory jurisdiction on the ICJ.159 The 
ROC’s proposals made unique contributions to the UN Charter in certain 
regards. Article 13, which mandates the General Assembly to promote 
“the progressive development of international law and its codification,” 
was based on the Chinese delegation’s proposal.160 Article 13 
subsequently led to the creation of today’s International Law Commission, 
which is composed of prominent jurists committed to the statutory 
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mandate.161 Moreover, the ROC’s main effort was reflected in the 
trusteeship system. The United States, the United Kingdom and France 
initially objected to the ROC’s position that the trusteeship’s basic 
objective should be independence rather than merely self-government.162 
With smaller states’ support, Article 76 includes the “progressive 
development towards self-government or independence” as the primary 
goal of trust territories. 
2. International and Foreign Courts 
The ROC’s wartime policy and postwar stance on the LN and the UN 
formed an integral part of its Grotian moment. The escalation of the 
ROC’s legal capacity was demonstrated not only in the nation’s 
participation in multilateral organizations, but also in its strategic 
engagement in court proceedings. Its assertive legalism in international 
tribunals was distinct from the hesitant approach of the Qing Dynasty and 
the PRC. Although the Qing government took part in the two Hague Peace 
Conferences that created the first multilateral judicial forum, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Qing officials were suspicious about the 
impartiality of the West-dominated court.  
For example, in 1909, the Qing government declined Portugal’s 
proposal to resort to the processes of the PCA to adjudicate territorial 
disputes between China and Portugal-ruled Macao.163 Likewise, in 1963, 
the PRC rejected India’s suggestion to resolve border conflicts before the 
PCA.164 The PRC’s entrance into the UN did not change its sensitivity 
toward sovereignty and international courts. In 1972, the PRC even 
informed the UN of its refusal to recognize the ROC’s acceptance of the 
ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, registered under Article 36 of the Statute of 
the ICJ.165 It was not until 2009 that the PRC’s participation in the ICJ 
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 162. Tang, supra note 17, at 721; China and the United Nations, supra note 142, at 58–60. For 
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page number.  
 163. JEROME ALAN COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 11 (1974). 
 164. ZHONG GUO GUO JI FA SHI JIAN YU AN LI [International Law in China: Cases and Practice] 
371 (Duan Jielong ed., 2010).  
 165. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status as at 1 April 2009, at 29 
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advisory proceedings on Kosovo’s declaration of independence marked 
the government’s first appearance before the Court.166 
The ROC’s participation in international tribunals was based on an 
aspiration to act as a civilized nation. Its concern about sovereignty was no 
less than the Qing or PRC regimes; however, the positivist stance of the 
ROC’s international lawyers enabled them to resort to international 
adjudication to resolve sovereign disputes. Their participation in judicial 
proceedings illustrated the Republican Chinese characteristics of statism, 
pragmatism and idealism. The ROC’s first attempt to resort to the PCA 
related to the previously-discussed declaration of war against Germany as 
a means to revoke unequal treaties. During WWI, Germany sought the 
assistance of the Netherlands, a neutral state, to attend to German interests 
in China.167 The Beiyang Government and the Netherlands disagreed as to 
whether German arms and ammunition should be taken over by China or 
the Dutch Embassy.168 In 1917, the ROC requested that this issue be 
referred to the PCA on the basis of the 1915 Sino-Dutch treaty on dispute 
resolution.169 Although this dispute never entered formal proceedings due 
to a delayed Dutch response and the end of the war, it highlighted the 
ROC’s rising assertive legalism.170 
The first instance in which the ROC defended a case before the PCA 
was in a 1935 case involving a US corporation, Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA).171 The dispute arose from the ROC’s conclusion of the 
Radio Traffic Agreement and a supplemental agreement with Mackay 
Radio and Telegraph Company.172 RCA claimed that these agreements 
violated the Traffic Agreement that the ROC had concluded with RCA.173 
 
 
 166. Jia, supra note 3, at 46–47. For information on the PRC’s participation in other international 
courts, see Julian Ku, China and the Future of International Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT’L L. 154, 
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123 (2012); Henry Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 41, 1–34 (2007). For the PRC’s legal arguments with “Chinese characteristics,” see Mary E. 
Footer & Andrew R. Forbes, Changing Ideologies in Trade, Technology and Development: The 
Challenge of China for International Trade Law, in 2 THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF 
LAW 309, 309–22 (Sam Muller et al. eds., 2012). 
 167. Cai, supra note 114, at 81. With respect to German issues, Dutch Minister, Jonkheer Frans 
Beelaerts, became the key negotiators with the Chinese government. Id. at 82. 
 168. Id. at 97–110. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Cai, supra note 114.  
 171. Radio Corporation of America v. The National Government of the Republic of China (1935). 
 172. Award of the Tribunal, Radio Corp. of Am. v. The Nat’l Gov’t of the Rep. of China, 3 U.N. 
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According to the arbitrators, the texts of the Traffic Agreement were not 
“exclusive by nature,” and such an agreement did not constitute “a relation 
of partnership or a joint venture” that inhibited potential competition.174 
Furthermore, they accepted the ROC’s defense that a radio circuit was “a 
public service” and that it is “the Chinese Government’s duty” to enable 
nationals to use other facilities. The arbitrators, all of whom were 
Europeans, ruled in favor of the ROC.175 As a result, the RCA case 
became China’s first successful case on the international stage. 
The ROC’s assertive legalism grew in tandem with the emergence of 
Chinese jurists serving on international court benches. Wang Chung-hui, 
Sun Yat Sun’s first Foreign Minister and Chiang Kai-Shek’s legal advisor, 
was appointed as the first Chinese PCIJ judge.176 Wang was subsequently 
succeeded by Chen Tien-hsi.177 The three-year preliminary proceedings 
that involved Belgium’s challenge to the ROC’s renunciation of the 1865 
Sino-Belgium Treaty ended with Belgium’s withdrawal of its complaint in 
1929.178 After WWII, Mei Ju-ao, a former law professor of the Central 
Political School, served as a judge on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.179 
Eleven judges tried 28 high-profile Japanese leaders for war crime 
charges, including Japanese atrocities during the Nanking Massacre.180 
Mei’s firm position on imposing the death penalty on the defendants 
contrasted with the positions of many Western judges.181 It diametrically 
opposed the view of the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal, who found all of 
the accused not guilty.182 The shared stance of Mei and other ROC 
 
 
 174. Id. at 1626–29. 
 175. See supra note 171, at cover page. 
 176. See Spiermann, supra note 49, at 119 (“[Wang] was present for the first time at the third 
ordinary session in 1923, where the Permanent Court delivered its ﬁrst judgment, in The Wimbledon, 
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 177. League of Nations Photo Archive, Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Individual 
Judges in Alphabetical Order, http://www.indiana.edu/~league/pcijindjudges.htm (last visited July 3, 
2015). 
 178. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865, between China and Belgium (Belg. v. 
China), supra note 131, at 6–7. 
 179. Mei Ju-ao was a judge of the Tribunal from 1946 to 1948. Legal Robe Worn by Mei Ju-ao in 
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, NAT. MUSEUM OF CHINA, http://en.chnmuseum.cn/tabid/549/ 
Default.aspx?AntiqueLanguageID=4117 (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
 180. See The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, CND.ORG, http://cnd.org/mirror/nanjing/NMTT.html (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2013) (“Seven (7) were sentenced to death by hanging, sixteen (16) to life 
imprisonment, and two (2) to lesser terms.”). 
 181. He Qinhua, Dao Du: Mei Ru-ao Yu “Yuan Dong Guo Ji Jun Shi Fa Ting” [Introduction: Mei 
Ru-ao and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East], in MEI RU-AO, YUAN DONG GUO JI 
JUN SHI FA TING [International Military Tribunal for the Far East] 1, 6–7 (2005). 
 182. See Ushimura Kei, Pal’s “Dissentient Judgment” Reconsidered: Some Notes on Postwar 
Japan’s Responses to the Opinion, 19 JAPAN REV. 215, 217–18 (2007) (discussing Radhabinod Pal’s 
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international lawyers on the death penalty showed that the idealism the 
nation upheld was dissimilar to European ideology. After Mei, Hsu Mo 
and Wellington Koo became judges of the ICJ, the principal judicial organ 
of the UN.183 Koo was the last judge nominated by the National 
Government.184 The ROC participated in the ICJ’s first two advisory 
proceedings in 1948 and 1949.185 The written submissions demonstrated 
the nation’s position on the conditions for a state’s admission to UN 
membership, and detailed its views on reparation for injuries suffered in 
the service of the UN. 
In addition to international courts, the ROC’s strategic engagement in 
judicial proceedings was applied in foreign courts. The Kwang Yuan case, 
described as the Sino-Japanese war in San Francisco, was the most 
prominent case that was litigated in US courts during WWII.186 Kwang 
Yuan was a steamship originally named Edna Christensen and was sold by 
its American owners to China’s Yung Yuan Steamship Company.187 The 
company entered into a charter party with a Japanese company for 
transporting 2,100 tons of scrap metal to Japan.188 The scrap was to be 
used to produce military weapons against Chinese forces. To obstruct the 
voyage, the ROC expropriated the ship in 1938.189 The Yokohama Specie 
Bank, the owner of the scrap, immediately requested that the court in San 
Francisco order the movement of the ship to discharge the cargo. Without 
challenging the ownership of the scrap, the ROC countered that the court 
lacked jurisdiction over the vessel following its expropriation.190 The 
court, therefore, declined the Japanese side’s request to direct the 
movement of the vessel and to use the gear due to comity and 
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Kwang Yuan]. Chao Chin Huang, the ROC consul general in San Francisco, played an important role 
in legal arguments in this case. 
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jurisdictional immunity.191 The court’s ruling essentially rendered it 
impossible to ship the scrap to Japan. These cases demonstrated the impact 
of the ROC’s assertive legalism on foreign policy and further buttressed 
the argument that the CCP’s accusation of the National Government’s pro-
imperialist stance is unfounded. 
C. The Intellectual Legacy of International Lawyers 
The civilized nation concept, which was introduced to China through 
Qing officials’ participation in the two Hague Peace Conferences, evolved 
to be the ROC’s guiding principle. During two World Wars, the ROC not 
only abrogated the unequal treaties regime, but also rose from a semi-
colonial state to a global power. The evolution of the discipline of 
international law influenced the ROC’s assertive legalism, evidenced in 
the nation’s participation in the LN, the UN and judicial proceedings. Its 
loss in the Chinese civil war compelled the National Government to 
relocate to Taiwan in 1949. As most international lawyers sided with the 
National Government, they significantly contributed to restoring the 
international law capacity and tackling Taiwan’s sui generis status. 
1. The Restoration of International Law Capacity 
After the Communist takeover, the PRC announced the abolition of 
the ROC’s legal system that had matured through various legal reforms in 
an attempt to abrogate extraterritoriality.192 Mao’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideology became the guiding principle of the new “no-law” regime. 
Higher education collapsed during the ten-year Cultural Revolution. Many 
international lawyers, including Mei Ju-ao, failed to survive the political 
chaos. The dark age of international law in the PRC nonetheless still 
showed the legacy of legal talents trained in the era of Republican 
China.193 Zhou Gengsheng, who argued rebus sic stantibus for treaty 
revision, published the two-volume Guo Ji Fa (International Law) in 
 
 
 191. Id. at 331–32. 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:87 
 
 
 
 
1976.194 It became the leading textbook in the PRC.195 During the Korean 
War, the PRC adopted the concept of the Chinese People’s Volunteer 
Army.196 The emphasis on the “volunteer” nature of this force was meant 
to obfuscate the PRC’s official participation in the war and to support the 
claim that Chinese forces’ involvement was based on “self-defense” 
against Washington’s “aggression against Korea.”197 
Zhou’s student, Wang Tieya, restored the PRC’s international law 
research at Peking University in 1979.198 In the early 1980s, Ni Zhengyu, 
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal veteran, participated in the Huguang 
Railway Bond case.199 The Alabama court was asked to decide whether 
the PRC could assert sovereign immunity concerning unpaid principal and 
interest that arose from Qing government-issued bonds to finance railroad 
construction.200 Beijing initially declined to appear before the US court but 
later decided to retain Baker & McKenzie, which persuaded the court to 
set aside the unfavorable default judgment.201 With Ni’s assistance, this 
case became the first instance in which the PRC took part in foreign 
proceedings.202 Ni subsequently became the first PRC-nominated ICJ 
judge in 1985, nearly two decades after Wellington Koo’s term ended.203 
On the Taiwan side, international lawyers both contributed to the 
reintroduction of international law and transplanted Republican Chinese 
characteristics to the former Japanese colony. One of the prominent 
institutions was Taipei Imperial University, which was renamed National 
 
 
 194. Chen, supra note 39. Zhou was praised by PRC scholars as the father of modern international 
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Taiwan University (NTU).204 Although Tachi Sakutaro and Yasuo 
Yamashita served as the first two professors of international law, the 
Japanese legacy did not influence Taiwan as it did during the late Qing 
and early Republican China.205 Peng Ming-ing, a Paris-educated lawyer, 
was NTU’s first Taiwanese international law professor.206 Despite his 
leading status, his academic influence waned following his arrest for 
advocating for Taiwan’s independence. The re-establishment of National 
Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taiwan in 1954 was a milestone in 
international law research. NCCU, previously known as the Central 
Political School in the Mainland, was the cradle for ROC diplomats during 
WWII. Hsu Mo, the ROC’s former ICJ judge, made international law a 
key subject when he founded NCCU’s Department of Diplomacy.207 
Hungdah Chiu, a former student of Peng at NTU, joined NCCU after 
receiving his doctorate degree from Harvard Law School.208 Chiu 
cultivated many prominent international lawyers, including Taiwan 
president Ma Ying-jeou.209 The Chinese (Taiwan) Yearbook of 
International Law and Affairs, which Chiu edited for 22 years, remains as 
the most comprehensive English publication on the ROC’s state 
practice.210 
The critical mass of international lawyers who relocated to Taiwan 
also founded the Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law in 1958, 
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which joined the ILA in 1961.211 The Society’s accession to the ILA 
signified the first Chinese participation in the Association after the Qing 
Dynasty. Due to the ILA’s attempts to accommodate a PRC branch, the 
Society’s title underwent several changes.212 Pursuant to Article 8.3 of the 
ILA Constitution, an ILA branch may represent “a single country or a 
geographical area within a country.”213 Hence, sovereign complexity never 
prevented Beijing from joining the ILA. In 1956, the PRC’s Chinese 
Political Science and Law Association joined the ILA, but it subsequently 
withdrew.214 The PRC’s Chinese Society of International Law, which was 
founded in 1980, submitted its application to the ILA in 1988.215 The 
application was withdrawn following the ILA’s explanation that the name 
of the Chinese (Taiwan) Branch would not be amended.216 Thus, Taiwan’s 
membership to the exclusion of the PRC in the ILA is a unique case. The 
efforts of international lawyers to develop the discipline in higher 
education and in diplomatic circles galvanized the evolution of 
international law in Taiwan. 
2. Taiwan’s Sui Generis Status 
UN Resolution 2758 that transferred the UN seat to the PRC in 1971 
was a major setback in ROC diplomacy. The loss of UN membership and 
the severance of diplomatic ties with most states led to Taiwan’s sui 
generis status. The political complexity went beyond the statehood 
definition under the Montevideo Convention, which Taiwan presumably 
 
 
 211. The Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law was originally named as the Chinese 
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met.217 Consequently, the research focus of international law shifted from 
treaty law to recognition issues. The ROC’s international lawyers devised 
legalist approaches to tackle the “one-China” problem. These approaches 
evidenced Taiwan’s inheritance of the Republican Chinese characteristics 
of statism, pragmatism and idealism. 
First, the international lawyers, many of whom were bureaucrat-
scholars, crafted a pragmatic strategy for Taiwan’s involvement in the 
international regime. Such pragmatism, which bypassed the sovereignty 
issue, enabled the ROC’s access to fisheries agreements as a “fishing 
entity” and to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a “separate 
customs territory.”218 Moreover, Taiwan applied UN conventions in 
bilateral treaties, such as the 1982 Taiwan-Korea agreement under which 
both countries agreed to comply with the International Convention on 
Tonnage Measurement of Ships.219 Statism and idealism can best be 
exemplified in Taiwan’s “internalization” of international human right 
treaties. The ROC signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1967 but did not ratify them before the ROC 
left the UN in 1971.220 Taiwan’s Congress transformed these two 
covenants into domestic law by enacting the Act to Implement the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR.221 These efforts enabled Taiwan to uphold the civilized 
nation principle by unilaterally complying with international obligations. 
Second, under the guidance of ROC’s international lawyers, the 
assertive legalism approach has also been applied to foreign court 
proceedings to deal with the de-recognition plight. The pluralism of the 
jurisprudence on Taiwan is indicative of Taiwan’s legal complexity. The 
utmost concern was Washington’s switch of recognition to the PRC in 
1979 and the potential legal consequences associated with government 
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succession.222 In response, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations 
Act (TRA) through a joint effort with the ROC’s international lawyers, 
such as Hungdah Chiu. The TRA states that the severance of diplomatic 
ties with the ROC “shall not affect the application of the laws of the 
United States with respect to Taiwan.”223 Significantly, the so-called 
“Twin Oaks provision” has enabled Taiwan to keep possession of the 
ROC’s embassy property without its being transferred to the PRC.224 
Taiwan’s legal strategy did suffer setbacks in some instances. A key 
example was the Kuang Hua Liao (Kokaryo) case, which involved the 
ownership of a dormitory that Taiwan had purchased prior to Japan’s 
recognition of the PRC in 1972.225 The Osaka High Court found in favor 
of Taiwan because of “incomplete succession of government” in the case 
of China.226 Notwithstanding the fact that the case was pending for 20 
years, the Japanese Supreme Court quashed the decision. The Court held 
that Japan’s recognition of Beijing in 1972 rendered the ROC’s 
representation on behalf of “the State of China” invalid.227 Notably, the 
Japanese decision carefully focused on a narrow ground. It did not 
foreclose the possibility of the ROC re-filing the case as a de facto state 
rather than as the state of China.228 
Western courts, including those in countries that lack domestic 
legislation akin to the TRA, differed from the Japanese court. The Tahiti 
Property case concerned the ROC’s ownership of a block of land that it 
had purchased for consulate use in the French Polynesian island of 
Tahiti.229 The French Appellate Court found that the ROC exists as “a 
Chinese state” despite the lack of France’s diplomatic recognition.230 
Confirming the decision, the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) 
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rejected the PRC’s argument that the ROC had ceased to be a state and 
thus lacked standing in proceedings.231 The Court, relying on procedural 
rules, decided that since the PRC opposed the ROC, it could not challenge 
the ROC’s capacity as a defendant.232 Courts in Switzerland and Canada 
went even further. They found that the ROC on Taiwan met the statehood 
criteria under the Montevideo Convention, hence recognizing the nation’s 
capacity to sue and its sovereign immunity.233 These cases reaffirmed the 
effectiveness of the ROC’s assertive legalism in dealing with its sui 
generis status. 
Finally, the versatility of the discipline of international law has been 
evidenced not only in state-to-state relations, but also in intra-China 
negotiations. Such quasi-application of international law traces back to 
Manchukuo-National Government interactions. Through the ROC’s 
attempts, the LN’s collective non-recognition policy prevented 
Manchukuo’s accession to international treaties and organizations.234 
However, due to pragmatic needs, the ROC and Manchukuo concluded a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) on postal services in 1934. The 
MoU thus functioned as a bilateral “treaty” without implying recognition 
under international law. Similarly, without recognizing each other as a 
“state,” the ROC and the PRC concluded 22 cross-strait agreements, 
ranging from intellectual property protection to repatriation matters, from 
1993 to 2011.235 
A political premise for these agreements is the “1992 consensus,” in 
which both governments agreed that there is one China and that the “one 
China” definition is subject to respective interpretation. Arguably, the 
1992 consensus was based on an exchange of notes and should be 
construed as binding. Thus, legally speaking, the cross-strait agreements 
are distinct from the 1972 Basic Treaty, under which the two Germanys 
formally recognized each other. The Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany also found that the Basic Treaty was a “treaty under international 
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law” and governed Germany’s “inter se relations.”236 Nonetheless, from a 
pragmatic perspective, the cross-strait agreements are in fact comparable 
to the Basic Treaty because they regulate intra-Chinese ties in compliance 
with international law principles. A notable example is the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which the two governments 
concluded in 2010.237 The ECFA, a free trade agreement under WTO law, 
normalizes bilateral economic ties.238 Consequently, the application of 
international law in advancing Taiwan’s international standing and cross-
strait relations signified the evolution of the discipline. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article unveiled the critical development of the law of nations by 
examining the evolution of international law as a professional and 
intellectual discipline in the ROC. It argued that the Republican Chinese 
characteristics of statism, pragmatism and idealism define the ROC’s 
international law approach. These characteristics transformed the 
Eurocentric law of nations and galvanized modern China’s intellectual 
shift from Westphalian sovereignty to the civilized nation principle. By 
discussing the professionalization of international law in modern China, 
this Article offered insight into the development of international law 
education and Western influences. It further explored how the reform of 
the Foreign Ministry, as well as the international law society and the 
Shanghai Mixed Court experiences, cultivated China’s first-generation of 
international lawyers. Based on their positivist stance on international law, 
these prominent jurists resorted to the policy of assertive legalism to 
advance the fragile nation’s diplomatic objectives. 
The ROC’s strategic engagement with international law was 
evidenced in the revision of the unequal treaties and its participation in 
international organizations and courts. The ROC’s wartime policy and its 
role in the founding of the UN best characterized the international 
lawyers’ idealism and led to the nation’s Grotian moment. Following the 
Chinese civil war, the international lawyers’ assertion of legal claims to 
tackle Taiwan’s sui generis status and to facilitate cross-strait negotiations 
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further reinforced the dynamic dimension of international law. Therefore, 
the ROC’s centennial development of international law, which shaped 
foreign relations of Republican China and contemporary Taiwan, provides 
a valuable case study of twentieth century international lawmaking in East 
Asia.  
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APPENDIX 1: SELECTED LIST OF ROC/NATIONALIST INTERNATIONAL 
LAWYERS 
Name Legal Education Selected Positions Note 
Wu Ting-fang (NG 
Choy) 
伍廷芳 (1842-
1922) 
University College 
London & 
Lincoln’s Inn 
Qing Minister to the 
United States (1897-1899); 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(1916-1917) 
Born in Singapore 
Eugene Chen (Chen 
Yu-jen) 
陳友仁 (1878-
1944) 
Saint Mary’s 
College, Trinidad 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(1931-1932) 
Born in Trinidad  
Wang Chung-hui 
王寵惠 (1881-
1958) 
LL.B., Beiyang 
University, 
Tianjin;  
DCL, Yale 
University 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(1912; 1937-1941); Deputy 
Judge & Judge, PCIJ 
(1922-1936) 
First ROC Foreign 
Minister; first 
Chinese judge at 
international courts 
Chengting Thomas 
Wang (C.T. Wang) 
王正廷 (1882-
1961) 
Beiyang 
University, Tianjin 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(Beiyang Government 
1922-1923, 1924; 1926); 
(Nationalist Government 
1928-131) 
First Chinese 
member, Permanent 
Court of Arbitration; 
first Chinese 
member, 
International 
Olympic Committee 
Cheng Tien-hsi 
(F.T. Cheng) 
鄭天錫 (1884-
1970) 
LL.D., University 
College London 
Judge, PCIJ (1936-1942)  
V.K. Wellington 
Koo 
顧維鈞 (1888-
1985) 
Ph.D. (political 
science), 
Columbia 
University 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(Beiyang Government 
1922, 1926-1927; 1931); 
Judge, ICJ (1956-1967) 
 
Zhou Gengsheng 
周鯁生(1889-1971) 
Ph.D. (law), 
University of Paris 
President, National Wuhan 
University (1945-1949) 
Stayed in Mainland 
China after 1949 
Wang Shijie 
王世杰 (1891-
1981) 
Ph.D. (law), 
University of Paris 
Founding President, 
National Wuhan 
University (1929-1933); 
ROC Foreign Minister 
(1945-1948) 
 
Yan Shutang 
燕樹棠 (1891-
1984) 
LL.B., Beiyang 
University, 
Tianjin; J.S.D., 
Yale University 
Chair, Department of Law, 
National Peking University 
& National Southwestern 
University, Kunming 
(1935-1938) 
Stayed in Mainland 
China after 1949 
Hsiang Che-chun 
(Xiang Zhejun) 
向哲浚 (1892-
1987) 
J.D., George 
Washington 
University 
Prosecutor, International 
Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (1946-1948) 
Stayed in Mainland 
China after 1949 
Hsu Mo  
徐謨 (1893-1956) 
 
LL.B., Beiyang 
University, 
Tianjin; LL.M., 
George 
Washington 
University 
Founding Chair, 
Department of Diplomacy, 
National Chengchi 
University (1930-1939); 
Judge, ICJ (1946-1956) 
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Name Legal Education Selected Positions Note 
John C. H. Wu 
吳經熊 (1899-
1986) 
LL.B, Soochow 
University; J.D., 
Michigan 
University 
Judge, Shanghai 
Provisional Court (1927-
1929); ROC Minister to 
the Vatican (1947-1948) 
Principal drafter of 
the 1946 ROC 
Constitution 
Yuen-li Liang 
梁鋆立 (1903-
1979) 
LL.B, Soochow 
University; S.J.D., 
George 
Washington 
University 
Director, UN Division on 
the Development and 
Codification of 
International Law (1946-
1964) 
 
Mei Ju-ao 
梅汝璈 (1904-
1973) 
J.D., Chicago 
University 
Judge, International 
Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (1946-1948) 
Stayed in Mainland 
China after 1949 
Tsui Shu-chin 
崔書琴 (1906-
1957) 
Ph.D. (political 
science), Harvard 
University  
Professor, Department of 
Political Science, National 
Southwestern University, 
Kunming (1938-1946); 
Founding Director, 
Graduate Institute of 
International Law and 
Diplomacy, National 
Chengchi University 
(1954-1955) 
 
Ni Zhengyu 
倪征燠 (1906-
2003) 
LL.B, Soochow 
University; J.D., 
Stanford 
University 
Chief Adviser of the 
Chinese Procutorial Group, 
International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East 
(1947-1948); Judge, ICJ 
(nominated by the PRC, 
1985-1994) 
Stayed in Mainland 
China after 1949 
Peng Ming-min 
彭明敏 (1923-
present) 
LL.M., McGill 
University; Ph.D. 
(law), University 
of Paris 
Chair, Department of 
Political Science, National 
Taiwan University (1961-
1962) 
Democratic 
Progressive Party 
candidate for 
Taiwan’s first 
presidential election 
(1995-1996) 
Hungdah Chiu 
丘宏達 (1936-
2011) 
LL.B., National 
Taiwan 
University; S.J.D., 
Harvard 
University 
Professor, University of 
Maryland School of Law 
(1974-2011); President, 
Chinese (Taiwan) Society 
of International law (1993-
1998); President, 
International Law 
Association (1998-2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
